Abstract-We propose a simple universal (that is, distribution-graphical image free) steganographic system in which covertexts with and without which the distril hidden texts are statistically indistinguishable. The stegosystem be reasonably a can be applied to any source generating i.i.d. covertexts with unknown distribution, and the hidden text is transmitted exactly,
I. INTRODUCTION
systems, see e.g
The goal of steganography is as follows. Alice and Bob can
We use the exchange messages of a certain kind (called covertexts) over following [2] . 1 a public channel which is open to Eve. The covertexts can be, oracle which ge for example, a sequence of photographic images, videos, text covertexts accor emails and so on. Alice wants to pass some secret information Covertexts beloi to Bob so that Eve cannot notice that any hidden information wants to use thi was passed. Thus, Alice should use the covertexts to hide hidden message the secret text. Alice and Bob may share a secret key. A generated indep classical illustration from [12] states the problem in terms of We denote the communication in a prison: Alice and Bob are prisoners who commonly used want to concoct an escape plan passing each other messages it is assumed tha which can be read by a ward.
a key shared on We assume that Eve does not attempt to disrupt commu-then the encrypt nication between Alice and Bob, but only tries to determine the Bernoulli 1/ whether secret information is being passed. block or stream Perhaps the first formal approach to steganography was like" a sequenc taken by Cachin [1] , [2] who proposed a steganographic "look like" mea protocol in which, relying on the fact that the probability or that the liker distribution of covertexts is known, covertexts with and with-data, known for out hidden information are statistically close. In the same third party, Eve, work a universal (distribution-free) steganographic system was Bob and is tryi proposed, in which this property holds only asymptotically being passed in I with the size of the messages going to infinity, and which has with and withou exponential complexity of coding and decoding. distribution (,u) Distribution-free stegosystems are of particular practical We propose a importance, since in reality covertexts can be a sequence of that is, covertex Daniil Ryabko IDSIA, Switzerland daniil@ryabko.net s, ICQ or email messages, that is, sources for bution is not only unknown but perhaps cannot pproximated. t of a known covertext distribution, theoretical ectly secure stegosystems (that is, stegosystems text with and without hidden information are istinguishable) was analyzed in [8] , [5] . an information-theoretic approach, where "stainguishable" means that the covertexts with dden information have the same probability other words, Eve does not get any information ag different kinds of the covertexts. It is worth e Shannon's celebrated paper "Communication .cy systems" [11] , the information-theoretic fficiently applied to many problems of secrecy [6] and references therein. following model for steganography, mainly It is assumed that Alice has an access to an ,nerates independent and identically distributed rding to some fixed but unknown distribution ,u. ng to some (possibly infinite) alphabet A. Alice is source for transmitting hidden messages. A -i is a sequence of letters from B = {0, 1} )endently with equal probabilities of 0 and 1. source of hidden messages by w. This is a Imodel for the source of secret messages since at secret messages are encrypted by Alice using ily with Bob. If Alice uses the Vernam cipher Led messages are indeed generated according to /2 distribution, whereas if Alice uses modern ciphers then the encrypted sequence "looks ce of random Bernoulli 1/2 trials. (Here to ins to be indistinguishable in polynomial time, ness is confirmed experimentally by statistical all widely used cyphers; see e.g. [7] , [9] .) The ,is reading all messages passed from Alice to Lng to determine whether secret messages are the covertexts or not. Observe that if covertexts the same distribution (and hence are statistically indistinguishable) for any size of the message, for any source of i.i.d. covertexts. The hidden text is transmitted correctly with probability 1. Moreover, the proposed system has two important properties. First, the rate of transmission of hidden information approaches the Shannon entropy of the covertext source as the size n of blocks used for hidden text encoding tends to infinity. Second, if the size of the alphabet of the covertext source and its minentropy tend to infinity then the number of bits of hidden text per letter of covertext tends to log(n!)/n where n is the (fixed) size of blocks used for hidden text encoding. We note that it is also possible to use the proposed stegosystems for open-key steganography, since the steganographic protocol does not require any secret key.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II a simple stegosystem which does not use randomization is proposed;
for this system the number of bits of hidden text per letter of covertext tends to 1/2 if the size of the alphabet of the covertext source and its minentropy tend to infinity. This system also illustrates the main ideas used in Section III, where the general (randomized) stegosystem is proposed which has the mentioned asymptotic properties of the rates of hidden text transmission. In Section IV we discuss possible extensions of the proposed steganographic systems and outline some potentially interesting open problems.
II. A SIMPLE NON-RANDOMIZED UNIVERSAL

STEGOSYSTEM
In this section we present a very simple stegosystem which demonstrates the main ideas used in the general stegosystem which we develop in the next section. The stegosystem de- First consider an example. Consider a situation in which not only the secret letters are drawn (using w) from a binary alphabet, but also the source of covertexts ,u generates symbols from the alphabet A = {a, b} (not necessarily with equal probabilities). Suppose that Alice has to transmit the sequence Y* = Y1Y2 ... generated according to w and let there be given a covertext sequence x* = x1x2 ... generated by ,u. For example, let y 01100 ..., x aababaaaabbaaaaabb .... (1) The sequences x* and y* are encoded in a new sequence X (to be transmitted to Bob) such that y* is uniquely determined by X and the distribution of X is the same as the distribution of x* (that is, ,u; in other words, X and x* are statistically indistinguishable). The encoding is carried out in two steps. First let us group all symbols of x* into pairs, and denote aa = u, bb = u, ab = vo, ba = v1.
In our example, the sequence (1) is represented as Decoding is obvious: Bob groups the symbols of X into pairs, ignores all occurrences of aa and bb and changes ab to 0 and ba to 1. The properties of the described stegosystem, which we call St2, are summarized in the following (nearly obvious) statement.
Claim 1: Suppose that a source ,u generates i.i.d. random variables taking values in A = {a, b} and let this source be used for encoding secret messages consisting of a sequence of i.i.d. equiprobable binary symbols using the method St2. Then the sequence of symbols output by the stegosystem obeys the same distribution ,u as the input sequence. We will not give the (obvious) proof of this claim since it is a simple corollary of Theorem 1 below.
It is interesting to note that a similar construction was used by von Neumann in his method for obtaining a sequence of equiprobable binary symbols (see [13] , [3] ) from a sequence of independent flips of a biased coin. His method, as well as the stegosystem just described, was based on the fact that the probabilities of ab and ba are equal.
Next we consider the generalisation of the described stegosystem to the case of an arbitrary alphabet A (such that lAl > 1). To do this we fix some total ordering on the set A. As before, Alice has to transmit a sequence y* = Y1Y2 ... generated by the source w of i.i.d. equiprobable binary letters and let there be given a sequence x* = x1x2 ... of covertext letters generated i.i.d. according to a distribution ,u on A.
Again we transform the sequences y* and x* into a new sequence X which obeys the same distribution as x*. As before we break x* into blocks of length 2. If a block X2i-lX2i has the form aa for some a e A then it is left unchanged.
Otherwise let the block X2i-X12i be ab for a, b C A and suppose a < b; if the current symbol Yk is 0 then the block ab is included in X, and if Yk = 1 then ba is included in X. If a > b then encode in the opposite way. To decode, the sequence is broken into pairs of symbols, all pairs of the form aa are ignored and a pair of the form ab is decoded as 0 if a < b and as 1 otherwise. Denote this stegosystem by St2(A). Proof: Fix some a, /3 C A and k C N. We will show that p(X2k-1 X2k = a3) = (a3), where p is the probability distribution of the output sequence.
Suppose a < /3. Decomposing the probability on the left we get p(X2k lX2k ad3) = w(Yk = 0)(u(a3) + u(/3a)) 2 (u(a/3) + u(a/3)) = u(a3).
The case j3 < a is analogous, and the case j3 = a is trivial. The second statement is obtained by calculating the probability that letters in the block coincide. U Note that in practice when the covertexts are, for example, graphical files, each covertext is practically unique (the alphabet A is potentially infinite) so that the number of covertext letters (files) per one hidden bit is approximately 2.
III. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF A UNIVERSAL
STEGOSYSTEM
In this section we consider the general construction of universal stegosystem which has the desired asymptotic properties. As before, Alice needs to transmit a sequence y* = Y1Y2 ... of secret binary messages drawn from an i.i.d. source w with equal probabilities of 0 and 1, and let there be given a sequence of covertexts x* = x1x2 ... drawn i.i.d. from a source ,u with alphabet A. First we break the sequence x* into blocks of n symbols each, where n > 1 is a parameter. Each block will be used to transmit several symbols from y* (for example, in the previously constructed stegosystem St2(A) each block of length 2 was used to transmit 1 or 0 symbols). However, in the general case a problem arises which was not present in the construction of St2(A). Namely, we have to align the lengths of the blocks of symbols from x* and from y*, and for this we will need randomization. The problem is that the probabilities of blocks from y* are divisible by powers of 2, which is not necessarily the case with blocks from x*.
We now present a formal description. Let u denote the first n symbols of x*: u = x1 ...x., and let vu (a) be the number (In other words, the word ST is being output by the coder.) Then Alice reads the next n-bit word, and so on. Denote the constructed stegosystem by St (A).
To decode the received sequence Bob breaks it into blocks of length n and repeats all the steps in the reversed order: by the current word u he obtains Su, and T, then d (clearly d is uniquely defined by T), r and r*; that is, he finds lr* next symbols of the secret sequence y*.
Consider an example which illustrates all the steps of the 
where ,u(u) is the ,u-probability of the word u and vu (a) is the number of occurrences of the letter a in the word U.
Proof: To prove the first statement it is sufficient to show that for any covertext word u of length n its probability of occurrence in the output sequence is 1/ Su . This follows from (2) and the fact that letters in y* are independent and equiprobable.
The second statement can be obtained by direct calculation of the average number of symbols from y* encoded by one block. Indeed, from (2) we find that for each covertext word u the expected number of transmitted symbols is Proof: This statement follows from a well-known fact of Information Theory which states that for each d > 0 and n -* oo the following inequality holds with probability 1 h(p) -< log |Sull/n < h(p) + 6, see e.g. [4] .
In many real stegosystems the alphabet A is huge (it can consist, for example, of all possible digital photographs of given file format, or of all possible e-mail messages). In such a case it is interesting to consider the asymptotic behaviour of Ln with fixed n when the alphabet size A goes to infinity. Proof: This statement simply follows from the fact that the number of different permutations of n elements is n!. U When the alphabet size is supposed to be very large another parameter of a stegosystem becomes important, namely the number of draws from the oracle distribution. In this context we note that the number of symbols per transmitted covertext in the proposed stegosystem is also the number of symbols per generated covertext; that is, no extra draws from the oracle are necessary.
Next we briefly consider the resource complexity of the stegosystem Stn(A). To store all possible words from the set Su would require memory of order 2n log A bits, which is practically unacceptable for large n. However, if we use the algorithm for fast enumeration from [10] , then we can find the index of a block sT given T (encoding) and vice versa (decoding) using 0(logconst n) operations per symbol and O(n log3 n) bits of memory. However, the main idea that was used in the proposed stegosystems is that for any block of covertexts it is possible to find several other blocks which have the same probability as the original one; then hidden information can be encoded in the number of a block in this group. This idea can be extended to the case of non-independent covertexts. Indeed, suppose that on the current step of transmission we known that some covertexts have equal probabilities to appear as the next generated covertext. That is, among the conditional (given the current history) probabilities of covertexts there are several groups of equal probabilities. Then, if the probability of the next generated covertext belongs to one of these groups, we can use this covertext (possibly replacing it with another one which has the same probability) for encoding several next bits of hiddentext in the same fashion as it is done in St, (A). The same applies to blocks of covertexts. Indeed the only feature of independently and identically distributed covertexts that we use is that all permutations of a word of size n have equal probabilities. So the next step is to identify equal conditional probability groups in sources of non-i.i.d. covertexts.
